The miliı.ary secondary school was established in Baghdad in 1872. Atlendance in 1898 was 269 sludenı<;; in 1900 it was 256. By 1909 another miliı.ary sccondary school had bcen opcned in Süleymaniye. The government paid the students' expenscs in Baghdad, including room and board and sent !.he graduates of lhe military secondary school to İstanbul, reimbursing their traavcI fees and supporting them through the War College. Thus lhe army became an ideal career for lower-class Iraqis from less promincm families. Poor farmilies made their sons attend the miliı.ary secondary school in Baghdad so !.hat iLmight Icad to !.heir completing their higher studies in the Each year from i874 to the First World War, an average of thirty to forty Iraqi military secondary school graduates went on to İstanbul; in 1903 the Iraqis were ten pereent of the total number admitted to the War Coııege. By 1914, the military secondary schools in Iraq were sending over a hundrcd cadets a year to İstanbuL. By the beginning of the First World War same 1,200 had become Ottoman army officers. Graduates of the War Coııege in İstanbul were commissioned as lieutenants and most of the Iraqis among them were later stationcd in their provinces. By impcrial dceree, officers from Arabic-speaking areas were sent back to their own regions, while other officers drew lots for assignment. From the last quarter of the nineteenth century up to the end of the First World War, no Arab district supplied more, or of higher standard, officers to the Ottoman anny than did Iraq.3 Iraqis studying at the Istanbul War Coııege were comfortablc in the Ottoman milicu. As Iraqi Moslems under Ottoman suzerainty for more than 300 years, they had bccome acdimaLİsed, accepLİng the spiritual and temporal lcadership of the Ottoman sultan-caliph, looking to Iraqis such as Mahmut Şevket Pasha, who had attained a high pasition in the Ottoman establishment, as an ideal example of upward mobility. They appreciated the opportunity to study in cosmopolitan İstanbul, the center of intellectual fermenl. While at the War Coııege, they leamed French and attendcd lcctures by German instructors on the history of war, weapons, military organisation, strategy, tactics and miliuıry literature. As army cadets, they were imprcssed with the tcehnical and militmy education they received, by the general staff system that instiııed (Jr(ler and respect for efficiency, and with the elevatian of the methods of war to the level of science, once again creaLİng the possibility of Moslcm military ascendance. Reading the chief Gennan instructor Geneml Colmar Freiherr Von Der Goltz's The Natinn in Arms, they were imprcssed by his thoughLs on the role of the army and educaLİon in society. But they read other things as welL. Like the Turks, the Arab students secretly 2A. R. al-Hilali, History of Educatlon in Iraq In the OUoman Era: 1538 -1917 , Baghdad, 1959 . See also K. Karpat, 'Reinterpreting Otloman History: A Note on the Condİlion of Eduealion İn 1874', International Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 2, 1981-1982, pp. 93-100 and D. Pool, 'From Elite to Class: The Transformatİon of Iraqİ Leadership, 1920 -1939 ', International Journal of Mlddle East Studies, Vol. 12, 1980 read lhe works of Namık Kemal, lhe Onoman liberal, and ıhey joined lhe Arab-Onoman broıherhood socieıies which advocaıed equaliıy for all members of ıhe Oııoman Empire. 4
The Arabs were breıhren in faiıh wiıh ıhe Turks bul had a number of grievances againsı the Ottoman adminisıration. In Iraq, lhe poeıs Marul ' alRusafi (1875 ' alRusafi ( -1945 and lamiI al-Zahawi (1863-I936) criıicised absolutc rule's injustices whilc remaining loyal Onoman subjecLs. When the Young Turk revolL occurred, therefore, Iraqis saw the new regime as one of reform. In facı, the Young Turks, following their revolution, made a geslure of good will towards the Arabs. The policy of Ottomanism was adopıed with a view of assuring common lotaly to the Empire on ıhe basis of equality. But ıhis only proved to be a brief inıerlucle and was followed by disappointmenL Growing efforLs to link ıhe provinces more ıightly to İstanbul and ıhe call ıo firmer c1iscipline were the Young Turks' formula for regenerating the Onarnan Empire. Arab intelligentsia resemed ıhe Young Turks' policy of centralisatian. The Arabs did not conccal their binemess and ıhe nıpture was a signal for them to organİse nationalist associations. Arab intellccıuals and pOlİlical acıivisıs began to com c around lo ıhe view thal lhe cullural and poliıical aspirations of the Arabs would be be ller servecl by lhe separation of the Arab provinces from the resl of the Ottoman Empire and, so mc felı, by the cremian of an Arab stale under an Arab king, A few of these individuals were also aware ıhat the achievements of these aims would not be entirely unwelcome to the European powers, particularly Britain. 5
As a resulı, number of Arab secrel societies were established in various parts of the Empire. One of thesc, al-Ahd (ıhe Covenant), foundcd by Aziz Ali al-Misri in 1914, was dominaıecl by a group of army officers of Iraqi origin, manyol' whom were to bccome Icading politicians uncler the mandaıe and monarchy. Hence by ıhe ıime of ıhe First World War lhe idea that the Arabs should break away from lhe Onoman Empire, ıhough generally not the more spccific notion of forming a seperate Iraqi state, had bcgun LO gain ground among poliıical activisLs in Iraq and some of these Iraqi officers were to play a major rolc in lhe British-sponsorcd Sharifian army, which started the Arab revolt in the Hijaz in 1916. An unspccificd number of officers of Iraqi origin in ıhe Onoman army, such as Nuri al-Said, offered ıheir services 4lbid. 5See H. Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks, London, 1997, in parlicu1ar chapter three on 'The Oppositİon and the Arabs, 1910 Arabs, -1911 New York, 1977, Vol. 2, pp. 273-280. to the British and manyol' them eventually entered the so-called North Arab Anny to serve either on Faisal's staff or as field commander. 6 it must, however, be particularly pointed out that most Arab officers remained loyal to the Ouoman state to the end of the war. Among those who joined the Sharifian army were very few who on their own initiative had gone over to the Otloman Empire's enemies. The British recruited Faisal's soldiers from the prisoner-of-war camps in India, requesting that the India command send the Arab prisoners to the Hijaz, which they bcgan to do in 1916. Many Iraqis were not informed of their destination, nar were they given advance briefing, so that of the 132 prisoners who arrived in June 1916, for example, 102 officers and soldiers refused to fightthe Turks; of the deven officers, only three joined the Sharifians.7
King Faisal i of Iraq received his crown from the British and derived his support from British planes and, primarily, from the c1ique of Oltomantrained army officers who had shared a common background of school, military service and experience of Faisal's provisional govemment in Syria. These officiers, most of whom entered the new Iraqi officer corps or took up civilian posts arter the creatian of the Kingdam of Iraq comprised the new state's educated elite. Both the Oltoman Empire with its focus on Islam and the Arab provinces as they had known them, no longer existed. Secularly educatcd, the officers drew upon their İstanbul educational experience and subsequent war-time events in order to devise their own ideology. Like Faisal, they had liuIc support in Iraq although most of them had been bom there. Altogether their number amounted to about 300 and, with few exceptions, they were of Sunni scct and came from Baghdad or the northem part of the country. The only connections which Faisal had with Iraq were through these officers and their roots were not deep. Few came from notabIc or Icading families. The strength of the bond tying them to the throne differed according to individual circumstances, but it is useful to distinguish between the later recruits to the Sharifian cause, i.e. the officers who joined Faisal's service in Syria arter the end of the war with the Turks in Octobcr i9 i8, like Yashin al.Hashimi who did not desen the Ottoman army but rose to the rank of a general and gained successes against the British troops in PaIcstine, and tlıe earlier volunteers who rallied from the beginning to the revolt raised in 1916 the ensuing desert campaigns and, of necessity, became more closely identified with the Sharifian familyand iı,>intercsts.!! Of course, Faisal relied, in the first place, on the officers who fought for him longest or stood by his side through danger or adversity, on such men as, Jafar al-Askari, Nuri al-Said, Jamil al-Midfai and Ali Jawdat alAyyubi, all of whom rose eventually LO the premiership. Attachment to the Sharifian cause and to Faisal's mavement in Syria gave them an advanlage. These men had no personal wealth or family prestige and hence were dependent upon Faisal for their power. The creatian of a national army was stimulated by the necessity of absorbing, as far as possible, the large and articulate group of unemployed and discontented ex-officers from the Ottoman army. The problem was further aggravated by the acute jealousy between the ex-Sharifian and ex-Oltoman officers. Marcover, Iraqi ex-olTicials formcrly in Otloman service (and same of them, indecd, did not desen the Turks until the fall of the Otloman Empire) as well as local notables regarded the ex-Sharifian officers with suspician and kar, Iest they appropriate all the best posts. There was, for that ma lter, definite animosity between the Sharifian vetemns and former officers from the Otloman service such a,>Bakr Sidqi who staged the 1936 coup.1 O The Sharifian officers who Faisal brought with him were, of course, too few to govem the country on their own. As is indicated above, they had to share power with the ex-Otloman officials, who had neither laken part in the Sharifs rebellion nar had desired sccession from the Otloman state. For these officials, who had themselves formed part of the slate, the condition of 
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Iraq af ter 191H was most unsatisfactory. Once they had helped to rule a state which was the one Masıem Great Power in the world, now they were confined to a pelty kingdom which was occupied and controlled by a Christian power. This power had, furthermore, broughı in a number of obscure men and pul ıhem in posilions of auıhorily; and ıhese men wc re claiming ıhaı ıhey were ıhe only genuine Arab naıionalisıs, ıhaı ıheir uprising had inaugurated a new Arab renaissance, when in facı ıhey had merely been accessories lo the humiliaLİon of Islam. The sardonic binemess of ıhese official classes, wiıhoul whom Iraq could nol be govemed, knew no hounds. The elienls of lhe Briıish, Arab naıionalisLs? They would show them who were the ırue naLİonalisLs. When Nuri al-Said negoliaıed a treaıy wiıh Briıain in 1931, his opponenıs sel up a great agitatİon, claiming ıhal ıhe trcaty did nol give Iraq lrue independence bul was merely a diabolic device lO subject lhe COUnlry more firmly ıhan ever lo Briıish control. In the controversies which ensued, the supporıers of Nuri al-Said and Jafar al-Askari taunted Yasin al-Hashimi, who was opposed to ıhe trcaty, wiıh having done not1ıing for Arab nationalism: he had nol abandoned the Onomans in mid-war as ıhe Sharifian officers had done, buı had foughı by ıheir side unıil the end. 11
One of al-Hashimi's followers, Fahmi al-Mudarris, was moved to reply. 'IL is nol wisc', he wrote, lo blame al-Hashimi for having sıood firm with the Onoman army unLİI the la st shoı had been fired. His behaviour can be jusıified on two counls. In the first place, he had the duty, as a faithful commandcr, LO preserve the army and his own honour; in lhe second, he believed ıhaııhe destrucıion of the Oltoman army would Icad lhe Arabs lo be delivered over and to submiı to lhe Allies who would divide up their counıry imo zones of innuence, which is in facı whaı happencd. Secing whaı it means to keep faith, and whaı military regulaLİons are, had al-Hashimi abandoned lhe Onomans he would have included himself in ıhe caıegory of traitors. Again, how dare Faisal and his family claim ıo be ıhe Icaders of the Arabs and to have saved them from Onoman rule? In Oltoman Lİmes pcople were nol used lo hear of ıiıles such as King of ıhe Hijaz -a ıitle which Faisal's father had ı.aken lo himself. On lhe conlrary, ıhe proudesııiıle of lhe Oltoman sulıan-caliph on lhe ruİns of whose empire Iraq and so many oıher countries were built, exclaİmed al-Mudarris, was that of Kluıdim al-haramian al- AI-Mudarris expresscd to perfcction an attitude which was encountered again among the official classes of Iraq whose Ottoman careers had been ended by the British occupation: Iraq, he wrote, never was a Turkish colony; it was part of the Ottoman Empire which had bcen independent for more than six centuries. Neither was the state Turkish, but Ottoman. This meant that it gathered under iL';banner different races in the same manner as the Imqi state would today, had it bccn independent. The Iraqis were not under the yoke of Turkish rule, as theyare today under the Turks and the other races, in all the department of the state. There was no discrimination in rights or duties bctween the Turks and the Iraqis, and they shared offices, high positions and the good and the bad eqııally. The lraqi exercised rule, justice, administration and politics for centuries, not only in Iraq, but in all parts of the Ottoman Empire, which extended to Europc, Asia and Africa. 13
The German military advisers who reinstitutcd the Oltoman system of military education from 1880s onwards envisioned an onicers corps trained and organised on the Prussian model, namely an elite, homogencous, unificd group, albeit in this case drawn from the various linguistic and social groupings that made up the Empire. it would exist as a distinct social class and be the heart and soul of the army. The unity of iL';membcrship would not necessarily be through direct loyalty to the monarch but rather through the sharing of common experience and profession. Having common interests and common duties, the whole body would render itself responsible to each individual member. Thus, Iraqis who passed through the Ottoman military system maintained a bond eve n though they fought on different sides during the First World War. Yashin al-Hashimi, for example, who had servcd with Oltomans and was woıınded in the fighting in Palestine, was rescued by Nuri al-Said, who was fighting with the British, not only because the former was an Iraqi but bccause they were comrades-in-arms from the War College. Latcr, in Iraq, they were political adversaries during most of their careers, working together only when politics required their coopcration. 14 The legacy of the Otloman military education transcended purely military matters. It led to a system of networking and politicisation that would play a large role in Iraqi and Arab politics in later years. By the cnd of 1920s, the Ottoman-trained officers became the govcming elass in Iraq and until a new gencration of miliıııry men extinguishcd their name in 1958, they playcd a dominant role in public affairs through their possession of a wide array of political positions such as ministerial offices ambassadorships, provincial governorships, court officials and army officers. Nine of the fourtecn prime ministers from i921 to 1932, for example, werc former Ottoman army officers as were thirty-two out of fifty-six major cabinet 13Ibld., p. 278. 14 Pool, From Elite to Class, pp. 333-337. There is evidence that attendance at the Baghdad miliLary secondary school and İstanbul War College was most innuenLial expperience for many army officers who later achieved political power in Iraq. To be sure, other facLs such as a social hakground, familyand rcligion played a large role in forming a person's later political world view. Nonetheless, the shared schooling and experiences, and the friendships manyol' these ofTicers made during this period of early adulLhood, lasted and, for manyol' them, determincd Lhe circle of persons with whom they stayed in contact throughout the remainder of their lives.
The early 1920s, which brought the creation of Lhe Iraqi SLate, also marked the beginning of stiff opposition to foreign control. From the very foundation of the Iraqi kingdom, there was the nagging feciing that it was a make-bclieve kingdom, built on false pretences and kept going by a British design and for a British purpose. This was the origin and explanation of the rabid anti-British feelings of large sections of the ruling classes of Iraq, a 15lbid. See a!s() P. Marr, 'Iraq's Leaclership Dilernma: A Study in Leadership Trencls, 1948 -1968 ', Middle East Journal, Vol. 24, 1970 fecIing which persisted until the emI and which occasionally exploded in bursts of hatred and outrage. The British indeed had few friends in the kingdom they foundcd. The King and the Sharifian officers who came with him did not dare show gratitude to their patrons, but must always be pressing them for further concessions to make secure their own position and prestige. Moreover, the institutions of the mandate were calculated to arouse suspicion in the minds of the Moslcm politicians and administrators. Their blunt, uncomplicated minds saw in politics nothing but the exercise of power, and when they found themselves l1anked by British advisers who were susposed LOguide their steps and instruct them in League of Nations virtues, they were convinced that this was but an underhand manner of undermining their authority and diminishing their power. They were alsa indignant that Christians and foreigners should presume to teach them, who had ruled the country in Ouoman times, how to govern. l7
Nationalist opposition was to dominate the political scene right up to the revolution of 1958. The single minded strugglc against the mandatory power, ofLen accentuated violcnce and insurrection, finally achieved nominal independence in 1932. The conllict with BriLain distracted the Icadership from the pressing domestic prob\cms and stood in the way of coopemtion with the West that might have been beneficial to Iraq. The end of the mandate had significance for the ex-Sharifian officers gathered around King Faisal, in giying the m a frecr hand to exercisc control within the country, but the British authorities reLained supreme power and the vast majority of the population continued LObe excluded from any mcaningful participation in governmenL. 18
The throne inherited most of the power Icft by the British and cabinelS continucd to be controlled by pro-British former OUoman army offieers Icd by Nuri al-Said. The tightening grip of Faisal and his pro-British cohorts, in return, spawned a new opposiLion, which atlackcd the new trcaty of 1930 and the British conneclion. This mavement was far more broadly based and ably \cd than the opposition movements of the 1920s. Like the members of the govemment, the opposition Icaders were mainly OLLoman-trained army officers, but because of their opposition to the BriLish and the treaty they had remained at the margins of power. 19
The next twenty-six years of what was now the independent state represent, to a very great extent, a continuaLİon of the mandate in the sense thatthe 'permiııed polilical arcna' continued to be occupicd by the same old groups of peoplc who had bccome prominent in the i920s and their c10se friends and associates. Politicians in Baghdad continued to joekey for position, ignoring real problcms. As cabinets succeeded one another, the fabric of state and the constitutional structure bcgan to erode. The most obvious differenee betwecn the politics of the i920s and those of the 1930s, panicularly after the death of King Faisal i in i933 and the succession to the throne of his son G hazi (I 933-i939), was the emergence of the ,ırmed forces as a new locus of political power, although in many ways this development was more a change of stylc than of substance. 20
Here one has to remark that the carriers of aspirations to Arab nationalism and the content of the aspirations themselves underwent important qualitative changes with the passage of time. In the case of the Sharifian olTicers who threw in their lot with Faisal and the lratji state af ter 192 I, their original patriotic and nationalist aııitudes are not in doubl. By the end of the i920s, however, it was c1ear that such figures as Nuri al-Said and Jafar al-Askari had become content to accommodate themselves to the British, with the resuIL that any Arab nationalist eredentials they might once have had gnıduaIly eeased to count in their favour among the lraqi populaLİon.
Simultaneously, considerable ferment could be noticed in the armed forees. A group of offieers believed that the army was the only organised authority capable of accomplishing the desired change and initiming the neccessary reforms. The army had established its patriotic and nationalist eredentials in the hearts of many members of the urban population in the summer of i933 by its campaign against the Assyrians, who were considered as an imponant adjunct of the British presence. The military began to enter the politieal seene and some of army officers, sLİmulated by nationalist idea" and innuenced by the authoritarian regimes which were taking place outside the country, started to caIl for military rulc. The civiııian politicians, secking to Icad the inteIligentsia, responded with liberal and social democratic slogans and programs. In the confusion of these cornpeting ideas and forces, military intervention in politics increased. 21
The authoritarian regime that exerted the most powerful influenee on Iraqis, espcciaIly on the older gencration of nationalists, was that of Kemal Atatürk in Turkey. The modemist and progressive nature of the new Turkish Republie over the border had a high appcaling effect among them, as it had elsewhere in the Islamic world. The army officers ofıen discussed ıhe exisling Siluation in Iraq and eompared il unfavourably wiıh ıhe neighbouring government in Turkey. Jusı as ıhe Kemalisı administraıion in Turkey was eliminaıing foreign control and carrying oul reforms, so should the army officers in Iraq rulc ıheir counlry in order lo elcminaıe the lasl vesıiges of foreign control, lO create a stable poliıical machine, and, finally to liberate lhe sister Arab countries which were stili slruggIing ıowards freedam and uniıy. Their model, as well as their inspiration, was indeed Kemalisı Turkey, because ıhaı country, ıhey argued, had bccn ablc ıo mainwin iı~independence only ıhrough ıhe reorganisaıion of iıs army. Iraq's lack of progress and governmenuıl instabiliıy were conlrasıed wilh ıhe spccuıcular achievemenı<; of ıhe new Turkish regime and the solidiıy of lhe Kemalisı governmen!. As a Moslcm counıry with a background of similar tradiıions and problcms, Turkey offered a more altainable example than European regimes. Alıhough Turkey's radical secularisaıion found few advocaıes among older Iraqis, ıhe use of lhe stale lo encourage lhe developmenı of indusıry, agriculıure and educaıion did have wide appcaL. Above all, Kemal Atalürk's masıerful handling of Parliament secmed, panicularly lo miliwry, to set an examplc wonh following. 23
By ıhe enel of Octobcr 1936 the silualion was considered LO be ripe for the firsı of ıhe man)' military coups which have since shaken Iraq. General Bakr Sidqi, a gmduaıe of lhe War College of Istanbul who served in command pasilion in ıhe Oltoman army ıhroughoul lhe Firsl World War and who joined lhe newly-formcd Iraqi army in i92 i, seized power afler staging a miliwry coup. Sidqi had Jooked al ıhe Icader of his neighbour, Turkey, and found il significanı ıhaı he had arisen from humble army ranks lo rulc his counıry and carry oul reforms. 24 Hikmaı Sulciman, an Oııarnan educaıed lawyer who admired ıhe achievements of ıhe Kemalisı movemenl in Turkey, became ıhe Prime Minisıer and Bakr Sidqi acccding lo ıhe posl of the Chief of General Staff bccame ıhe sırong man and lhe real rulcr of lhe country. Sulciman, Sidqi's personal friend, had helped lO esıablish liaison belween ıhe young inıelIigenlsia and lhe army. The farmer emerged as the hero of ıhe revolulion and it was enlirely due to his efforL'>ıhaı the laııer was won far lhe group of radical intelIectuals. Sulciman, ıhe younger broıher of the pre-war Young Turk general Mahmut Şevkcı Pasha, must have remcmbcred his brother's great adventurous fcal when he marchcd on İstanbul at lhe head of the revoluıionary Ottoman Movement Army in July 1909, demanding lhe abdicaıian of the monarch. Wiıh thaı mcmory in mind, Sulciman persuaded Sidqi lo Icad a revoluıion in the Iraqi army in order LO force ıhe existing cabinet ıo resign. 25
Of all ıhe Iraqi politicians, Sulciman was best known for his courageous and advcnturous spiriı, for his fmnkness and straighıforwardness. He became popular among lhe young men because he appeared lo them as a progressive elder poliıician. He called himself a reformisı on the lines of ıhe Kemalist mavement in Turkey. His whole socİal and economic background was based on his own understanding of the Kemalist govemment. In 1935, he had spent a few months in Turkey. He visited same of its industrial complcxes and acquainted himself with ıhe counıry's social and economic development. Sulciman had bcen trained in İstanbul and had always admired the Turks, bul on ıhis visiı he was much more imprcssed as he was ablc LO eompare the development under the Kemalist adminislration wiıh ıhe Oııarnan reign under ıhe sultans. In December 1935, Sulciman relurned to Iraq and was seen walking down the streeL<; of Baghdad with a hat on his head -one noıiceable sign of lhe effect of his visit to Turkey. His admiration for the Turkish Icader had furlher increased afler his visit lo Turkey, folIowing which he wrole several articIes advocating a ıhoroughgoing modernisation and secularisaıion on Ankara's lines. 26
Both Sidqi and Sulciman were under the speII of ıhe Kemalist principles and praclices and boıh trİed to ıake lhem as a model for Iraq. They were boıh ardently pm-Turkish and had almosı ıhe same ouılook. One of Su!eiman's first official acıs was to announee ıhaı he would visit Ankara to eement Turkish-Iraqi friendship and lo observe Turkish reforms for possible introducıion inıo Iraq. He considered thaı the example provided by Atatürk was one to folIow, that true advancement was impossible so long as religious fanaticism remained. It must be emphasised, however, that from the point of view of historical parcllcl it would be far more accurate to compare the Sidqi regime with the short-lived governments of the Committee of Union and Progress set up by Western-innuenced Turkish officer-inteııectual groups in revolt against the monarchical rule. Unlike Awtürk, who eswblished his political regime as a victorious Commander-in-Chicf and who had rea! controlover his brethren officers as weıı as over the country as a wholc, Sidqi was goaded into action by a series of failures which Iraq had faced.
The military coup of October 29, 1936 proved to be a major turning point in Iraqi history. it made a critical breach in the constitution and paved the way for further army involvement in politics. The army had tested power and it graduaııy came to control political affairs. The coup was the first step toward the events of April 1941. The most important immediate effect of the coup was to remove the Icading figures of the previous government from Iraq. It made aciean, if temporary, sweep of the old ruling group that had governed the country since it was foundcd. Onlyone veteran politician, Hikmat Sulciman, could find his way into the new government. 28
For the next four years, until the spring of 1941, governments were made and dismissed according to the wishes of the army officers, and six more miliwry coups had taken place within this period. By this time, the military and civilian politicians had bccome divided broadly into two: those who were supporting Britain and its aııies against the Axis powers and those who were not. Britain's most prominent supporters were the Regent Abd al Illah and Nuri al-Said, and its most oUL~tanding opponents were Rashid Ali Following 1941, Nuri al-Said was the Icading sWtesman of Iraq and the chief represenwtive of the Hashemite eswblishment, whether he was in or out office. Even when he did not serve as minister, he was not rcally out of power, for he cither inlluenced policy through a protege or through the head of state as a privy counsellor. In the post Second World War cra, Iraq's political forces were divided into two broad major groups: the ruling conservative group deriving its strength primarily from land-owning elements, more particularly the sheiks of the Middle Euphrates and the nationalist and socialist opposition relying, by and large, on support in the cities. The conservalive group tended to rally around the person of Nuri alSaid, who emerged as time went on, not only as an undisputed Icader of the status quo forces, but also as the 'strong man of Iraq'. He acted as the chief supporter and servant of the Hashemite dynasty, bold spokesman for closer ties with Briwin and the West. 31
Nuri al-Said succeeded in organising not only a devOled following among the traditional rank and file but also in subordinating to his Icadership an impressive number of conservative elder statesmen. Such former Premiers In domestic affairs, Nuri al-Said tried to promote administrative effieicney and economic planning. He was a conservative, even an autoerat, and did not believe that parliamemary demoeraey was a suitablc from of government for Iraq. During his last years Nuri al-Said was not in tune with the social and political forees sweeping both the Arab world and Iraq and secmed to have liLLIcunderstanding of them. 34 The inability of the ruling stratum to grapplc with the basic structural probIcms stemmed from the necessity of its situation, i.e. from its living !inks with the established soeia! classes. The big landowners and wealthy merehams provided the core of his political support. Marcover, Nuri al-Said and the other principal ex-Sharifians had by this time become, economiealIy, members of the established ordcr. It should be mentioned that the outstanding Ottoman-trained officers had become part of the agricultural and eommercia! imereslS and Icss and Icss conscious and comprehending of the lower echelons of the people and the problcms and diffieulties of their dai!y life. 35 32 M. Khadduri, Independent Iraq (1932-ı958) , London, 1960, pp. 351-352 . 33 lbid . 34 A. Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, London, 1991, pp. 367-368. 35Baıaıu, Old Social Classes, pp. 351-352. ıVOL. XXVI One can corrcctly state that the most enthusiastic Icaders of the Iraqi national movement were young men, bom in the i880s and the early 1890s, who had rcceived military training in Istanbul and that they have played a central role in the conduct of the state affairs both under the British mandatory rulc and during the era of independence up to the overthrow of the monarchy on July 14, 1958. The ideas behind Ottoman government wc re duly passed on to the Iraqi officials trained in the Ottoman tradition, which was foundcd, above aıı, on the bedrock of authoritarian paternalism. Although these ideas were modified in time, they persisted with remarkable tenacity among Iraq's ruling group right through the first half of the twentieth century. Even among those committed to Arab nationalist goals, Ottoman values and ideals remained strong. Although a large number of the m later served in the Sharifian forces, their first and last love remained in the Onoman army, which they remembcred and respccted for its banlc discipline, physical toughness, the quality of its commanders and its raw and incomparablc fighting ability. Methods and views of the military-bureaucratic elite had not changed since their Onoman days. They were aıı true to the old tradition of the Turks. Four centuries of Ottoman customs had \eft their mark. The new generatian of Iraqis, no maner how vociferously they might denounce the Young Turks, resemblcd nothing so much as an Arab version of the Young Turks themselves.
Lastly, it would be fair to imlkate that the activities of the Onomantrained army officers bore fmit in the establishment of national governments, but their narrow nationalist view and conservative outlook, when chargcd with ruling the peop\e, would not alIow the more enlightened and liberal young men who emerged after the Second World War to share the authority with them. This fundamental connict betwccn the elder politicians and the new generation could be said to lay at the root of the bloody revolution which culminated in the kilIings of King Faisal II, the Regent Abd al IIIah and Nuri al-Said -the three main piııars of the ancient regime-and consequently led LO the eliminalion of the Ottoman-tnıined arıny officers from the political life of Iraq.
